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Nominal Henkin Semantics: simply-typed
lambda-calculus models in nominal sets
Murdoch J. Gabbay Dominic P. Mulligan∗
We investigate a class of nominal algebraic Henkin-style models for the simply typed λ -
calculus in which variables map to names in the denotation and λ -abstraction maps to a
(non-functional) name-abstraction operation. The resulting denotations are smaller and
better-behaved, in ways we make precise, than functional valuation-based models.
Using these new models, we then develop a generalisation of λ -term syntax enriching
them with existential meta-variables, thus yielding a theory of incomplete functions. This
incompleteness is orthogonal to the usual notion of incompleteness given by function ab-
straction and application, and corresponds to holes and incomplete objects.
1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a Henkin-style semantics for the simply-typed λ -calculus in nomi-
nal sets. The simply-typed λ -calculus (STLC) has notions of typed variable, substitution, and
function abstraction. Correspondingly, our models in nominal sets will enrich ‘ordinary’ sets
with typed names, a substitution action, and name-abstraction. Thus, concepts that are nor-
mally characteristic of syntax—like variable, substitution, and variable-binding—are explicitly
represented as nominal algebraic structure [22].
The resulting models have different properties from traditional valuation-style (‘closed’)
semantics. Intuitively this is because leaving names in the denotation gives the models more
structure—we have more information about ‘where an element came from’.
For instance, Proposition 3.6 (the (ξ ) rule) and Theorem 3.15 (well-pointedness) are proper-
ties that hold of the nominal models of this paper, and fail for ‘classical’ treatments (see Exam-
ples 3.7 and 3.16). This is because the direct inclusion of names into the denotation forces there
to be ‘enough’ elements of the model, and naturality requirements of the models require these
elements to be ‘sufficiently distinguishable’. These conditions cannot be expressed without
names in the denotation.
Furthermore, we find that we can extend this to a syntax and semantics for existential vari-
ables. That is, we will extend STLC syntax with ‘holes’. The technique used is essentially
the same as the nominal terms of [40] (a permissive variant thereof, following [6, 7]) but taking
semantics in nominal models of STLC instead of in datatypes of abstract syntax with binding.
Because λ -abstraction maps to atoms-abstraction, the denotation of functions does not in-
volve function spaces. Because variables map to themselves, valuations are not used either;
their role is taken by the substitution for names. Thus we obtain a simple ‘first-order flavoured’
completeness proof (Theorem 3.11).
In summary, nominal Henkin models differ from ‘ordinary’ Henkin models by including
variables and substitution in the underlying domain of the denotation as nominal algebraic
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(V)
Γ,a:φ ` a : φ
(type(C) = φ)
(C)
Γ `C : φ
Γ,a:φ ` r : ψ (a6∈dom(Γ))
(L)
Γ ` (λa:φ .r) : φ→ψ
Γ ` r : φ→ψ Γ ` s : φ
(A)
Γ ` rs : ψ
Figure 1: Typing rules for the simply-typed λ -calculus (STLC)
structure. This yields a new class of models which seems to not display certain pathologies of
the ‘ordinary’ models, and which can be leveraged to design novel calculi with applications
e.g. to existential variables.
2 Background
Background on simply-typed λ -calculus
Definition 2.1. Fix a countably infinite set of atoms A.
We use a permutative convention that a,b,c, . . . range over distinct atoms (so for instance in
Definition 2.3 the ai are silently assumed distinct, in Definition 2.8 a and b are taken distinct,
and so on).
Definition 2.2. 1. Fix a nonempty set of base types τ ∈ BaseTypes. Define (simple) types by
φ ::= τ | φ → φ . Let φ , ψ , χ range over types.
2. Fix a set of constants C ∈ Constants, to each of which is associated a type type(C).
Define terms by: r ::= a |C | λa:φ .r | rr. Let r, s, t range over terms. λa binds a in λa:φ .s
and we take terms up to α-equivalence as usual.
Define free atoms fa(r) by fa(a) = {a}, fa(C) =∅, fa(rs) = fa(r)∪ fa(s), and fa(λa:φ .r) = fa(r)\{a}.
Definition 2.3. Give terms a capture-avoiding substitution action r[ai:=si]n1 (side-conditions
can be guaranteed by α-renaming):
a j[ai:=si]n1 = s j b[ai:=si]
n
1 = b
C[ai:=si]n1 =C (λc:χ.r)[ai:=si]
n
1 = λc:χ.(r[ai:=si]
n
1) (c 6∈
⋃n
1({ai}∪ fa(si)))
(rs)[ai:=si]n1 = (r[ai:=si]
n
1)(s[ai:=si]
n
1)
Definition 2.4. Let =β be the least equivalence on terms (up to α-equivalence) such that:
r =β r
′ s =β s′
(CongApp)
rs =β r
′s
s =β s
′
(ξ )
λa:φ .s =β λa:φ .s′
(β )
(λa:φ .r)t =β r[a := t]
Definition 2.5. A type environment Γ is a set of atomic typings a : φ which is functional in the
sense that if a : φ and a : φ ′ then φ = φ ′.
Derivable typing judgements Γ ` r : φ are defined using the (standard) rules in Figure 1.
Define the domain of Γ by dom(Γ) = {a | ∃φ .(a:φ ∈ Γ)}. Write Γ,a:φ for the type environment
obtained by adding a:φ to Γ; if we write this, we impose a condition that a 6∈ dom(Γ).
Definition 2.6. A typing judgement is a tuple Γ ` r : φ . The derivable typing judgements are
defined in Figure 1.
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Background on nominal sets
Definition 2.7. The cumulative hierarchy of ZFA sets U is the least fixed point of U = A∪
powerset(U ). This can be constructed by starting from atoms and transfinitely adding all sub-
sets (a construction going back to Von Neumann [32]).
Definition 2.8. Given a,b ∈A write (a b) for the swapping bijection on atoms mapping a to b, b
to a, and any other c ∈ A\{a,b} to c.
If pi is a bijection on atoms define nontriv(pi) = {a | pi(a) 6= a}.
Write P for the group of bijections (finitely) generated by swappings, and call these bijec-
tions permutations.
Write pi ◦ pi ′ for the composition of pi and pi ′ (so (pi ◦ pi ′)(a) = pi(pi ′(a))). Write id for the
identity permutation (so id(a) = a always).
Lemma 2.9. A bijection pi on atoms is a permutation if and only if nontriv(pi) = {a | pi(a) 6= a} is finite.
Definition 2.10. Give U a permutation action pi·x inductively defined by pi·a = pi(a) for a ∈ A,
and pi·X = {pi·x | x ∈ X} for X ∈U \A.
If A⊆ A write fix(A) = {pi ∈ P | ∀a∈A.pi(a) = a}.
Say that A⊆ A supports x ∈U when ∀pi∈fix(A).pi·x = x.
Definition 2.11. Call an element x ∈ U finitely-supported when it has a unique least finite
supporting set supp(x). Write a#x for a 6∈ supp(x) and read this as ‘a is fresh for x’.
Lemma 2.12 ([24, 14]). If x ∈U has a finite supporting set A, then supp(x) exists.
Our reasoning can be formalised in first-order logic, enriched with the axioms of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with atoms (ZFA). This is just a formal way of stating that we have assumed
atoms and sets and we reason about them mathematically, but stating it in terms of formal logic
lets us express an important observation, that our reasoning is symmetric under permutation:
Theorem 2.13. If x denotes a list x1, . . . ,xn, write pi·x for pi·x1, . . . ,pi·xn. SupposeΦ(x) is a ZFA predicate
on variables included in x. Then we have equivariance [14, Section 4]:1 Φ(x)⇔Φ(pi·x).
We will appeal to equivariance repeatedly to quickly yet rigorously rename atoms, usually
while retaining an inductive hypothesis. See for instance Lemma 3.5.2
Definition 2.14. Say that X ∈ U \A has the trivial action when supp(x) = ∅ for every x ∈ X
(equivalently: when pi·x = x for every x ∈ X and permutation pi).
Definition 2.15. If X ,Y ∈U \A then a function(-set) from X to Y is a subset of X ×Y such that
∀x∈X .∃y∈Y.(x,y) ∈ f and ∀x,y,y′.((x,y) ∈ f ∧ (x,y′) ∈ f )⇒y = y′. Write X→Y for the set of all
functions from X to Y . Write X⇒Y for the set of all functions from X to Y with finite support.
Remark 2.16. The permutation action from Definition 2.10 gives f ∈ X→Y the conjugation per-
mutation action specified by pi·( f (x)) = (pi· f )(pi·x).
Lemma 2.17. If X and Y in U \A have the trivial permutation action (Definition 2.14), then so does
X→Y , and X→Y = X⇒Y . (If underlying sets have empty support then so do functions between them.)
1x must contain all the variables mentioned in the predicate. It is not the case that a = a if and only if a = b—but
it is the case that a = b if and only if b = a.
2This technique was used in pencil-and-paper mathematics instead of long inductive proofs, e.g. in [12].
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3 Nominal models for simple type theory
3.1 Nominal λ -model
Notation 3.1. Write pi·Γ= {pi(a):φ | a:φ ∈ Γ}.
Definition 3.2. A model I consists of an assignment for each type environment Γ and type φ of
a finitely-supported set JφKIΓ together with the following data:
1. For every a:φ ∈ Γ an element aIφ ∈ JφKIΓ.
2. For every constant C an element CI ∈ Jtype(C)KIΓ.
3. If x ∈ JψKIΓ,a:φ , an element [a:φ ]x ∈ Jφ→ψKIΓ.
4. For x ∈ Jφ→ψKIΓ and y ∈ JφKIΓ, an element x• y ∈ JψKIΓ.
5. JφKIΓ∩Γ′ = JφKIΓ∩ JφKIΓ′.
6. If x ∈ JφKIΓ then supp(x)⊆ dom(Γ).
I must be equivariant in the sense that:
pi·JφKIΓ = {pi·x | x ∈ JφKIΓ}= JφKIpi·Γ pi·aIφ = (pi(a))Iφ pi·CI =CI
pi·[a:φ ]x = [pi(a):φ ]pi·x pi·(x• y) = (pi·x)• (pi·y)
We write x[a 7→ y] as sugar for ([a:φ ]x)• y. In addition, I must be a nominal algebra for substi-
tution by satisfying rules (Suba), (Sub#), (SubApp), and (Subλ ); we fill in types as appropriate
(we discuss (SubId) below):
(Suba) aIφ [a 7→ x] = x
(Sub#) a#z⇒ z[a 7→ x] = z
(SubApp) (z′ • z)[a 7→ x] = (z′[a 7→ x])• (z[a 7→ x])
(Subλ ) c#x⇒ ([c:χ]z)[a 7→ x] = [c:χ](z[a 7→ x])
(SubId) z[a 7→ aI] = z
For the rest of this subsection fix a model I.
Let us break down the design of Definition 3.2. Obviously names inhabit the denotation in
a very direct and literal sense that aIφ ∈ JφKIΓ. The reader can think of a : φ as a constant which
must be interpreted ‘as itself’ by aIφ .
But aIφ also behaves like a variable: It can be renamed by pi·x, and bound by [a:φ ]x, and it
can also be substituted for. The rules (Suba) to (Subλ ) do the job that valuations do in ‘normal’
models; they replace a name aIφ by an(other) element of the model. The significant difference
is that in standard models we pick a valuation and then form a denotation; in nominal models
we form a denotation and then—if we wish—substitute for the free variables.
The axioms (Suba) to (SubId) can be made formal in nominal algebra [22]. These particu-
lar axioms are taken from [20].3 Instead of (Sub#) we could take a weaker axiom b[a7→x] = b.
Conversely, we could safely add (SubId) and thus exclude certain arguably pathological mod-
els. The language of Definition 2.2 is not expressive enough to detect these choices, but the
language of Definition 4.3 is (see Example 5.10).
3(Suba) to (SubId) soundly and completely characterise the syntactic model of substitution. In this paper we are
also interested in non-syntactic models, so weaker axioms—and thus more models—are reasonable. We chose the
axioms above because they are closed, in the sense of [9, 10], which gives better computational properties (if we ever
design an abstract machine using this semantics).
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Aside from the inclusion of names, our notion of model resembles Henkin models, which
have an applicative structure in which abstractions have a well-defined interpretation [26].
Just as is the case for Henkin models, Definition 3.2 specifies what a model must look like
but does not build one. We do build a concrete model out of syntax as part of the completeness
proof in Subsection 3.3.
The equivariance conditions are standard for nominal techniques; our models must be sym-
metric up to permuting atoms.
Finally, conditions 1 to 6 specify the structure of a model that makes it into a model of the
λ -calculus, by interpreting names (as themselves), constants, λ -abstraction (as a function of the
name a and the element x)4 and a Henkin-models style application.
Definition 3.3. Suppose Γ ` r : φ . Define an interpretation JrKIΓ ∈ JφKIΓ inductively by:
JaKIΓ,a:φ = aIφ JCKIΓ =CI JrsKIΓ = JrKIΓ • JsKIΓ Jλa:φ .rKIΓ = [a:φ ]JrKIΓ,a:φ
We now come to our first soundness theorem; if a term is typable then its denotation inhab-
its the denotation of its type:
Theorem 3.4 (First soundness theorem). If Γ ` r : φ then JrKIΓ ∈ JφKIΓ.
As a corollary using condition 5 of Definition 3.2, if Γ ` r : φ then supp(JrKIΓ)⊆ fa(r).
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the derivation of Γ ` r : φ :
• By the definition of model (Definition 3.2), if a : φ ∈ Γ then JaKIΓ = aIφ ∈ JφKIΓ, and JCKIΓ =
CI ∈ Jtype(C)KIΓ.
• Suppose Γ,a:φ ` r :ψ so that by (L) Γ` λa:φ .r : φ→ψ and by inductive hypothesis JrKIΓ,a:φ ∈JψKIΓ. By assumpion Jλa:φ .rKIΓ ∈ Jφ→ψKIΓ.
• If JrKIΓ ∈ Jφ→ψKIΓ and JsKIΓ ∈ JφKIΓ then JrKIΓ • JsKIΓ ∈ JφKIΓ.
3.2 Soundness for β -conversion
Lemma 3.5. Suppose Γ,a:φ ` r : ψ and Γ ` s : φ , where a 6∈ dom(Γ).
Then Jr[a := s]KIΓ = JrKIΓ,a:φ [a 7→ JsKIΓ].
Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of Γ,a:φ ` r : ψ :
• The case of (V) for a. By (Suba) aIφ [a 7→ JsKIΓ] = JsKIΓ. Also a[a := s] = s.
• The case of (V) for c:χ ∈ Γ. By (Sub#) cIχ [a 7→ JsKIΓ] = cIχ . Also c[a := s] = s.
• The case of (L) for λc:χ.r. By equivariance (Theorem 2.13) suppose c 6∈ dom(Γ)∪supp(JsKIΓ).5
The result follows using (Subλ ).
• The case of (A) uses (SubApp).
Proposition 3.6 (The ξ rule). Suppose Γ,a:φ ` r : ψ and Γ,a:φ ` s : ψ .
If JrKIΓ,a:φ = JsKIΓ,a:φ then Jλa:φ .rKIΓ = Jλa:φ .sKIΓ.
Proof. Immediate since by Definition 3.3 Jλa:φ .rKIΓ = [a:φ ]JrKIΓ,a:φ , and similarly for s.
4So [a:φ ]x need not be precisely equal to the Gabbay-Pitts atoms-abstraction [a]x from [24].
5In fact by Theorem 3.4 c 6∈ supp(JsKIΓ) follows from c 6∈ dom(Γ). But that does not matter; we can just rename c
‘fresh’, without having to engage in detailed calculations about how fresh it is.
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Example 3.7. Proposition 3.6 does not hold in a valuation semantics of ‘ordinary’ models. For
instance, consider a (valuation-based) semantics with one base type τ with denotation {0,1}
(a two-element set). Consider x and y and a valuation ρ mapping x and y both to 0. ThenJxKρ = 0 = JyKρ but Jλx:τ.xKρ 6= Jλx:τ.yKρ .
Corollary 3.8 (Second soundness theorem). If r =β s (Defn. 2.4) and Γ ` r : φ then JrKIΓ = JsKIΓ.
Proof. By some routine sets calculations, using Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 3.6.
3.3 Completeness
Definition 3.9. Write I;Γ  r=s when there exists φ (which is unique if it exists) such that Γ ` r:φ
and Γ ` s:φ , and JrKIΓ=JsKIΓ and JrKIΓ ∈ JφKIΓ. We call the (typed) equality Γ ` r=s valid in I.
We need one technical fact about nominal sets, for Theorem 3.11:
Lemma 3.10. Suppose Γ ` r : φ . If a 6∈ supp(〈r〉β) then there exists s such that T;Γ ` r = s and a 6∈ fa(s).
Proof. Using [15, Lemma 7.6.2].
Theorem 3.11. Γ  r = s implies r =β s.
Proof. We take as our model I where JrKIΓ = 〈r〉β and JφKIΓ = {〈r〉β | Γ ` r : φ}, and:
• If a : φ ∈ Γ then we take aIφ = 〈a〉β ∈ JφKIΓ.
• If 〈r〉β ∈ JψKIΓ,a:φ then we take [a:φ ]〈r〉β = 〈λa:φ .r〉β .
• Similarly, we take 〈r〉β • 〈s〉β = 〈rs〉β .
It is a fact that r =β r′ and s =β s′ imply λa:φ .r =β λa:φ .r′ and rs =β r′s′, and it follows that the
definition above is well-defined.
We must also check validity of rules (Suba) to (Subλ ). We consider two cases:
• The case of (Suba). It is a fact that (λa:φ .a)s =β s.
• The case of (Sub#). Suppose a#〈t〉β . By Lemma 3.10 there exists t ′ =β t such that a 6∈ fa(t ′).
So t ′[a := r] = t ′ and thus T;Γ ` t ′[a := r] = t ′. It follows that 〈t[a := r]〉β = 〈t〉β .
Furthermore, by construction if 〈r〉β = 〈s〉β then r =β s.
The proof of Theorem 3.11 resembles the proof of completeness for Henkin models, with
moderate changes to handle the ‘nominal’ models. Our models are not necessarily extensional
(that is, we do not insist that r = λa.(ra) for a not free in r) whereas Henkin semantics usually
are [26]; nevertheless it is reasonable to think of this as ‘Henkin semantics with names’. A
survey of complete non-extensional semantics for STLC is in [2].
Theorem 3.11 is simpler than it could be; we could generalise it to completeness for arbitrary
theories (i.e. we allow a set of equality axioms and prove completeness for the class of models
that validate those axioms). We expect this generalisation to be an easy replay of the existing
proof. We do not do this because the simpler case already illustrates the main points, and has
useful features which we can now explore.
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3.4 Well-pointedness
In Proposition 3.6 and Example 3.7 we saw that our nominal Henkin models have a desirable
property that ‘ordinary’ models do not. We now come to another; to state it we need a defini-
tion:
Definition 3.12. A homomorphism F from I to J is a collection of functions FφΓ mapping JφKIΓ
to JφKJΓ which are:
• Equivariant in the sense that pi·(FφΓ (x)) = Fφpi·Γ(pi·x) (Notation 3.1).
• Natural in the sense that F commutes with atoms, constants, abstraction, and •. So for
example, FφΓ,a:φ (a
I
φ ) = a
J
φ and F
ψ→φ
Γ ([a:ψ]x) = [a:ψ]F
φ
Γ,a:φ (x).
The notion of validity from Definition 3.9 is local in that it checks validity at one model.
There is also a global notion, which checks validity at the model and all ‘larger’ ones:
Definition 3.13. Suppose Γ ` r:φ and Γ ` s:φ . Say that I;Γ glo r = s when J;Γ  r = s in the sense
of Definition 3.9 for every J such that there exists a homomorphism F : I→ J.
Lemma 3.14. Suppose Γ ` r : φ and F : I→ J is a homomorphism. Then FφΓ (JrKIΓ) = JrKJΓ.
Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of Γ ` r : φ , using naturality.
Theorem 3.15 (Well-pointedness). Suppose Γ ` r : φ and Γ ` s : φ . Then I;Γ  r = s if and only if
I;Γ glo r = s.
Proof. By considering the identity homomorphism from I to itself, mapping x ∈ JφKIΓ to itself, it
is clear that I;Γ glo r = s implies I;Γ  r = s.
Conversely, suppose I;Γ  r = s and suppose F is a homomorphism from I to J. By assump-
tion JrKIΓ = JsKIΓ. It follows by Lemma 3.14 that JrKJΓ = FφΓ (JrKIΓ) = FφΓ (JsKJΓ) = JsKJΓ.
Example 3.16. Theorem 3.15 fails for traditional models. For instance, consider a functional
model in which all terms are equal because every type has just one element. So Γ ` r = s is
locally true, but not globally true.
Nominal Henkin semantics exclude this, because they have elements to interpret variables.
It is impossible to compress them all down to one element, as we did in the previous paragraph
for ‘ordinary’ models.
4 Existential variables
Nominal terms introduced to nominal techniques the idea of two levels of variable; atoms (as
above) and unknowns X , which are existential variables and in [40] were used in a unification
algorithm. The first author proposed combining nominal unknowns with non-trivial logical
theories, e.g. with first-order logic [19, 21]. Since in this paper we have a nominal semantics for
the STLC, it is natural to extend Definition 2.2 with nominal unknowns and so to add existential
variables.
The motivation for doing this is that STLC underlies many interesting logics and program-
ming languages, so that our semantics and syntax with existential variables have potential—
not exploited in this paper but motivating the constructions—to provide syntax and semantics
for ‘incomplete terms’. In common with all other such treatments, a difficulty is the delicacy of
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maintaining well-typedness under instantiation (which for nominal terms may be capturing;
see Remark 4.16). Our solution has elements of previous work, but it retains a distinct identity
and remains typically ‘nominal’.
We will use permissive nominal terms [7], which improve on the theory of α-equivalence
of nominal terms by allowing us to ‘just quotient’ syntax (nominal terms require a freshness
context and freshness context update, which are harder to manage in the presence of non-trivial
equalities/reductions on terms).
4.1 Syntax
Definition 4.1. Fix a partition of the set of atoms from Definition 2.1 into two disjoint countably
infinite sets A< and A>, so that A= A< unionmultiA>
Splitting A in two is key to the syntax, but not to the semantics: the notion of model in
Definition 5.3 is identical to Definition 3.2 and is based on finitely-supported nominal sets as
usual. Only the syntax uses the more powerful notions of A< and A> (and it is more powerful;
see e.g. Example 5.10). This echoes the formal distinction between ‘names that exist to be
bound’ and ‘names that exist to be free’ used in some treatments of logic [25, 39], though this
distinction is not so rigid here; e.g. a ‘standalone atom’ a can appear either from A< or A> and
via a permutation or substitution ‘migrate’ between them.
Definition 4.2. Fix a countably infinite set of unknowns. X , Y , Z will range over distinct un-
knowns.
Definition 4.3. Types are as in Definition 2.2. Terms are defined by:
r ::= a |C | X [bi:=si]ni=1 | λc:φ .s | rs ({bi | 1≤i≤n} ⊆ A< , c ∈ A>)
[bi := si] is a (level 1) substitution, which is a finite partial function from atoms to terms, map-
ping bi to si and undefined elsewhere (so finite substitutions are directly in this syntax, just like
finite permutations on unknowns pi·X are directly part of nominal terms). We call X [bi:=si]n1 a
moderated unknown.
The condition c ∈ A> may seem odd—so λa:φ .a is not well-formed syntax if a ∈ A< —but
since a is supposed to be bound we can intuitively always α-convert it to be in A>. This is a
useful ‘hygiene’ simplification, since just by looking at an atom a we can tell if it could be bound
(a ∈ A>) or captured by an instantiation (a ∈ A< ). We can always move between one world and
the other using a moderating substitution, as in λa:φ .X [b:=a] where a ∈ A> and b ∈ A< .
Example 4.4. • An incomplete term. The typing a,b:φ ,X :φ ` λa:φ .X [b:=a] : φ→φ where a ∈
A> and b ∈A< represents an incomplete typing ‘λx:φ .t where t has type φ ’. This is an term
for a function on one argument.
Looking forward to the level 1 and 2 substitutions in Definitions 4.10 and 5.1, we will be
able to complete λa:φ .X to a complete term, by applying the substitution [X := b]. We
get the identity λa:φ .a. Without unknowns, both the incomplete and the complete terms
would be represented by λa:φ . f a for a higher-order f : φ→φ (whereas X has type φ ).
• An incomplete HOL predicate. Assume base types ι and o and constants ⇒˙ : o→o→o and
∀˙ : (ι→o)→o. The typing X : o, Y : ι , b:ι ` (∀˙λb:ι .X)⇒˙X [b :=Y ] : o represents an incomplete
HOL predicate.
Without level 2 variables, both the incomplete and the complete terms would be repre-
sented by b:ι , f : ι→o ` (∀˙λb:ι . f a)⇒˙ f a.
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Definition 4.5. Suppose a permutation pi (Definition 2.8) is such that nontriv(pi) ⊆ A>. Define a
permutation action pi·r on terms by:
pi·a = pi(a) pi·λa:φ .r = λpi(a):φ .pi·r pi·C =C
pi·(rs) = (pi·r)(pi·s) pi·(X [bi := si]i) = X [bi := pi·si]i
Remark 4.6. Intuitively, the reason that we restrict nontriv(pi) to atoms in A> is so that we only
rename the atoms that can be λ -abstracted. This restriction could be removed, and the syntax
made ‘more equivariant’, but at the price of complicating the syntax X [bi := si]n1 to (pi·X)[bi := si]n1
so that we could write pi·(X [bi := si]i = (pi·X)[pi(bi):=pi·si]. There would be nothing wrong with
this—it just makes our basic syntax slightly more complicated. Since there is no change in
expressivity, we leave this out.
We could also emulate pi using the substitution [bi := si]n1, but then we must add (SubId).
Definition 4.7. Call a binary relationR on terms a congruence when it is closed under the rules
(CongApp) and (ξ ) in Definition 2.4 and in addition:6
si R s′i (1≤i≤n, {b1, . . . ,bn} ⊆ A< )
(CongX)
X [bi:=si]n1 R X [bi:=s
′
i]
n
1
Definition 4.8. α-equivalence r =α s is the least congruence such that if b ∈ A> \ fa(r) then
λa:φ .r =α λb:φ .(b a)·r. Henceforth we quotient terms by α-equivalence.
Definition 4.9. Define free atoms fa(r) and free unknowns fv(r) by:
fa(a) = {a} fa(λa:φ .r) = fa(r)\{a} fa(C) = ∅
fa(rs) = fa(r)∪ fa(s) fa(X [bi:=si]n1) = (A<\{bi | i})∪
⋃
i fa(si)
fv(a) = ∅ fv(λa:r.s) = fv(s)∪ fv(r) fv(C) = ∅
fv(rs) = fv(r)∪ fv(s) fv(X [ai:=si]n1) = {X}∪
⋃
i fv(si)
Definition 4.10. We give terms a capture-avoiding substitution action r[bi := si]n1 as follows:
b j[bi:=si]n1 = s j (1≤ j≤n)
a[bi:=si]n1 = a (a 6∈ {bi | 1≤i≤n})
C[bi:=si]n1 =C
X [bi:=si]i∈A[bi:=si]i∈B = X [ (bi:=si)i∈B\A, bi∈A< ,
(bi:=si[b j:=s j] j∈B)i∈A]
(B = {1, . . . ,n})
(λc:φ .r)[bi:=si]n1 = λc:φ .(r[bi:=si]
n
1) (c ∈ A> \ (
⋃
i{bi}∪ fa(si)))
(r′r)[bi:=si]n1 = (r
′[bi:=si]n1)(r[bi:=si]
n
1)
Note above that if bi ∈ A> then it gets garbage-collected (eliminated) on X , as we see from the
condition ‘bi ∈A< ’ in ‘i∈ B\A, bi ∈A< ’. So for instance X [b:=b′][b′:=b′′] = X [b:=b′′,b′:=b′′] where
b,b′,b′′ ∈ A< and X [b:=a][a:=b′′] = X [b:=b′′] where a ∈ A>.
Definition 4.11. Let β -equivalence − =β − be the least congruence (Definition 4.7) such that
(λa:φ .r)t =β r[a := t].
6The condition {b1, . . . ,bn} ⊆ A< is there to guarantee that X [bi:=si] and X [bi:=s′i] are well-formed terms.
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(a : φ ∈ Γ)
(V)
Γ ` a : φ
(type(C) = φ)
(C)
Γ `C : φ
Γ,a:φ ` r : ψ (a ∈ A>)
(L)
Γ ` (λa:φ .r) : φ→ψ
Γ ` r : φ→ψ Γ ` s : φ
(A)
Γ ` rs : ψ
Γ ` si : ψi (X :φ∈Γ, bi:ψi∈Γ, 1≤i≤n)
(Meta)
Γ ` X [bi:=si]n1 : φ
Figure 2: Typing rules for the simply-typed λ -calculus with holes
4.2 Environments and typing
Definition 4.12. A type environment Γ is a set of atomic typings a : φ or X : φ which is functional
in the sense that if a : φ and a : φ ′ then φ = φ ′, and similarly for X (i.e. ‘add X :φ to Definition 2.5’).
Define dom(Γ) = {a | ∃φ .a:φ ∈ Γ}∪{X | ∃φ .X :φ ∈ Γ}.
Definition 4.13. Define a typing relation by the rules in Figure 2.
One interesting feature of Figure 2 is that bi must be typed in Γ in (Meta). This means
that we can strengthen only for atoms in A> (the ‘abstractable’ atoms); see Lemma 4.15. See
Remarks 4.16 and 4.19 for discussions of why. Also, the si are typed in a context in which the bi
occur. There is no problem with circularities; in the models the bi are just elements (with special
properties).
Lemma 4.14 (Weakening). If Γ ` r : ψ and c 6∈ dom(Γ) then Γ,c:χ ` r : ψ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ` r : ψ . For the case of (L) we may rename using
equivariance (Theorem 2.13).
Lemma 4.15 (Strengthening). If Γ,c:χ ` r : ψ and c ∈ A> \ fa(r) then Γ ` r : ψ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ` r : ψ . For the case of (L) we may rename us-
ing equivariance (Theorem 2.13). The rule (Meta) is why we insist on c6∈A< ; the atoms {bi |
1≤i≤n} ⊆ A< may not feature in fa(r) but must be in Γ, as discussed in Remark 4.16.
Remark 4.16. (Meta) states that if X :φ ∈ Γ and bi:ψi ∈ Γ for 1≤i≤n then Γ ` si : ψi for 1≤i≤n
implies Γ ` X [bi:=si] : φ . We must insist on bi:ψi ∈ Γ, for suppose otherwise: Then for a∈A> and
b ∈ A< we could derive X :φ ,a:χ ` λb:φ .X [a := b] : φ→φ ; the types of a and b are inconsistent.
Lemma 4.17. fa(r[a := t])⊆ (fa(r)\{a})∪ fa(t)
Lemma 4.18. Γ,(ci:χi)n1 ` r : φ and Γ,(ci:χi)n1 ` s j : χ j for 1≤ j≤n imply Γ,(ci:χi)n1 ` r[ci := si]n1 : φ .
As a corollary, if c ∈ A> \ fa(s) then Γ,c:χ ` r : φ and Γ ` s : χ imply Γ ` r[c := s] : φ .
Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of Γ,(ci:χi)n1 ` r : φ . For the case of (L) we may
rename the bound atom in the derivation using equivariance (Theorem 2.13).
The corollary follows by Lemmas 4.14, 4.15, and 4.17.
Remark 4.19. Lemma 4.18 does not state Γ,c:χ ` r : φ and Γ ` s : χ imply Γ ` r[c := s] : φ , for
c ∈ A< . For instance X :φ ,c:φ ` X : φ and X :φ ` X : φ but it is not the case that X :φ ` X [c := X ] : φ .
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5 Level 2 substitution
Definition 5.1. A level 2 substitution is a map θ from unknowns to terms.7 Write [X := t] for
the substitution mapping X to t and all other Y to Y .
aθ = a (λa:φ .s)θ = λa:φ .(sθ) (a ∈ A>\⋃X∈fv(t) fa(θ(X))) Cθ =C
(rs)θ = (rθ)(sθ) X [bi:=si]n1θ = θ(X)[bi:=siθ ]
n
1
Proposition 5.2. If Γ,X :ξ ` r:φ and Γ ` t:ξ then Γ ` r[X := t]:φ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ,X :ξ ` r:φ . The cases of (V) and (A) are routine:
• The case of (Meta) for X . Suppose Γ,X :ξ ,(bi:ψi)n1 ` X [bi:=si]n1 : ξ because Γ,X :ξ ,(bi:ψi)n1 `
s j : ψ j for 1≤ j≤n.
Suppose Γ,(bi:ψi)n1 ` t : ξ . By inductive hypothesis Γ,(bi:ψi)n1 ` s j[X :=t] : ψ j for 1≤ j≤n.
By definition X [bi:=si]n1[X :=t] = t[bi:=si[X :=t]]
n
1. So it suffices to show that Γ,(bi:ψi)
n
1 `
t[bi:=si[X :=t]]n1 : ξ . We use Lemma 4.18.
• The case of (L). Renaming if necessary using equivariance (Theorem 2.13), assume a ∈
A> \ fa(t). By definition (λa:φ .r)[X :=t] = λa:φ .(r[X :=t]). We use the inductive hypothesis
for Γ,X :ξ ,a:φ ` r : ψ .
5.1 Models
Definition 5.3. A model I consists of an assignment for each type environment Γ and type φ
of a finitely-supported set JφKIΓ together with the same data as in Definition 3.2, satisfying the
same equivariance conditions and (Suba) to (Subλ ) except that in addition:
8. If Γ(a) = Γ′(a) for every a ∈ A then JφKIΓ = JφKIΓ′ (so the model ignores X :φ ∈ Γ and only
looks at the typing of atoms).
Definition 5.4 (Simultaneous substitution). Suppose bi:ψi ∈ Γ and yi ∈ JψiKIΓ for 1≤i≤n. Sup-
pose x ∈ JφKIΓ. Specify x[bi 7→yi]n1 to be equal to (((c1 b1) ◦ · · · ◦ (cn bn))·x)[c1 7→y1] . . . [cn 7→yn] for
fresh c1, . . . ,cn (so ci 6∈ supp(x)∪⋃i supp(yi) for 1≤ i≤ n).8
Lemma 5.5. If x ∈ JφKIΓ then pi·x ∈ JφKIpi·Γ.
Proof. Direct from equivariance (Theorem 2.13).
By Lemma 5.5 syntax is equivariant for atoms in A>, because the predicate we use to define
it in Definition 4.3 uses a partition A= A< ∪A>. The notion of model of Definition 5.3 does not
use this partition however, so it is equivariant for all pi , and not just those with nontriv(pi)⊆ A>.
Lemma 5.5 depends on this, and Lemma 5.6 uses it.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose bi:ψ ∈ Γ and yi ∈ JψKIΓ for 1≤i≤n, and suppose z ∈ JχKIΓ. Then z[bi 7→yi]n1 ∈ JχKIΓ.
7The reader familiar with nominal techniques might expect a condition that fa(θ(X)) ⊆ A< always. This would
be necessary if moderations were permutations, but is not if they are substitutions. See [15, Proposition 3.4.3].
8Definition 5.3 only provides substitution for one atom at a time. We need simultaneous substitution in the
semantics to give meaning to level 2 variables (see Definition 5.9). The minor difficulty is that it might be that
bi ∈ supp(y j). So we ‘rename atoms fresh’ first, and then substitute for these atoms one at a time. Certain detailed
but routine verifications are necessary to make sure this works and is well-defined (depends neither on the fresh
choice of ci, nor on the order in which the substitutions are then carried out). The relevant maths is described in [14,
Section 6].
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Proof. Unpack Definition 5.4 and use Lemma 5.5 and conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 5.3.
Definition 5.7. A valuation ς is a function on unknowns such that supp(ς(X))⊆A< for every X .
Write Γ  ς when X :φ ∈ Γ implies ς(X) ∈ JφKIΓ for every unknown X .
Remark 5.8. Definition 5.7 seems harmless, but it carries some real meaning. By condition 6
of Definitions 3.2 and 5.3, if x ∈ JφKIΓ then supp(x) ⊆ dom(Γ). This implies that if X :φ ∈ Γ then
X ranges over elements with support in dom(Γ). What happens to all the atoms in A< \ dom(Γ)?
They cannot be used (unless we weaken the context with more typings).
This is related to a celebrated topic of continuing debate in the philosophy of language
that assertions like ‘the King of France is bald’ name and assert properties of apparently non-
existent objects; they have meaning but do not denote [36]. In the same way, the variable X
asserts a property of all atoms in A< —that they may appear in the denotation of X—but this
does not imply that these atoms exist in the possible world determined by the typing Γ. The
typing context determines which of the atoms in A< have existential import [29]. The extra twist
to this story here, is that in nominal techniques atoms name themselves.
This is another way of looking at the fine detail of the rule (Meta), that bi:ψi ∈ Γ even though
bi 6∈ fa(X [bi:=si]n1]) in general. In order to be substituted for, the atom bi must exist, and to exist
it must be typed.
Definition 5.9. Suppose Γ  ς and Γ ` r : φ . Define an interpretation function mapping r toJrKIς ;Γ, by induction on r:
JaKIς ;Γ = aIφ (a:φ ∈ Γ) JCKIς ;Γ =CIJλa:φ .rKIς ;Γ = [a:φ ]JrKIς ;Γ (a ∈ A> \dom(Γ)) JrsKIς = JrKIς ;Γ • JsKIς ;ΓJX [bi := si]iKIς ;Γ = ς(X) [bi 7→ JsiKIς ;Γ]i (X :φ ∈ Γ)
A few brief words on the case of λa:φ .r: The condition a 6∈ dom(Γ) prevents a:φ from overwrit-
ing typing information in Γ. The condition a 6∈ A< ensures that the clause is well-defined, since
otherwise a might ‘accidentally capture’ an atom in ς(X) for X ∈ fv(r). The effect of a capturing
an atom in X can be attained e.g. as λa:φ .(X [a′:=a]) where a′ ∈ A< .
The language with holes (Definition 4.3) is more expressive than the language without it
(Definition 2.2). For instance, a:φ  r[a 7→a] = r (Definition 3.9) is true for r without unknowns,
but otherwise may be false. This is because without unknowns, we can use (Suba) to (Subλ )
to push substitution down to the atoms until it either vanishes or substitutes. With unknowns
this cannot be done; we may get ‘stuck’ on a moderated unknown.
Put another way, X really does range over arbitrary elements of the model whereas a can
only be substituted for an arbitrary element of the model—and these are two distinct concepts.
Example 5.10. Consider one base type and no constants and a nominal model I such that JτKIa:τ =
{aIτ ,0,1}, where supp(0) = supp(1) =∅. Set aIτ [a 7→x] = x, 0[a 7→x] = 0, and 1[a 7→x] = 0.
In STLC we cannot detect the element 1 and its sensitivity to [a7→x] even though a 6∈ supp(1).
In STLC extended with unknowns, we can. Thus, we use (Sub#) instead of a weaker axiom
that b[a 7→x] = x.
Theorem 5.11 (First soundness theorem). If Γ  ς and Γ ` r : φ then JrKIς ;Γ ∈ JφKIΓ.
Proof. We consider two cases; the rest is as proof of Theorem 3.4:
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• The case of (L). Suppose Γ,a:φ ` r : ψ and a ∈ A> so that by (L) Γ ` λa:φ .r : φ→ψ . By
inductive hypothesis JrKIς ;Γ,a:φ ∈ JψKIΓ,a:φ . It follows from condition 3 of Definition 5.3 that
[a:φ ]JrKIς ;Γ,a:φ ∈ Jφ→ψKIΓ. By Definition 5.9, Jλa:φ .rKIς ;Γ ∈ Jφ→ψKIΓ.
• The case of (Meta). Suppose Γ ` si : ψi and X :φ ∈ Γ and bi:ψi ∈ Γ for 1≤i≤n, so that by
(Meta) Γ ` X [bi:=si]i : φ .
By inductive hypothesis JsiKIς ;Γ ∈ JψiKIΓ and by assumption ς(X) ∈ JφKIΓ. It follows by
Lemma 5.6 that ς(X) [bi:=JsiKIς ;Γ]i ∈ JφKIΓ.
5.2 Soundness for β -conversion
Lemma 5.12. Suppose ai:φi ∈ Γ for i ∈ A and Γ ` r : ψ and Γ ` si : φi for i ∈ A. Suppose Γ  ς . ThenJr[ai := si]i∈AKIς ;Γ = JrKIς ;Γ[ai 7→ JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A.
Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of Γ ` r : ψ . We consider two cases:
• The case of (L) for λc:χ.r. Renaming if necessary, suppose c is fresh (so that c 6∈⋃i∈A(supp(JsiKIς ;Γ)∪
fa(si))∪dom(Γ)). We reason as follows:
Jλc:χ.rKIς ;Γ[ai 7→ JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A = ([c:χ]JrKIς ;Γ)[ai 7→ JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A Definition 5.9
= [c:χ](JrKIς ;Γ[ai 7→ JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A) (Subλ ), c 6∈ supp(JsKIς ;Γ)
= [c:χ]Jr[ai := si]i∈AKIς ;Γ ind. hyp.
= Jλc:χ.(r[ai := si]i∈A)KIς ;Γ Definition 5.9
= J(λc:χ.r)[ai := si]i∈AKIς ;Γ c 6∈ fa(s)
• The case of (Meta). We reason as follows, where B = {1, . . . ,n} and {b j | j ∈ B} ⊆ A< :
JX [a j:=t j] j∈BKIς ;Γ[ai 7→JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A = ς(X)[a j 7→Jt jKIς ;Γ]i∈B[ai 7→JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A Defn. 5.9
= ς(X)[(ai 7→JsiKIς ;Γ)i∈A\B, ai∈A< ,(a j 7→Jt jKIς ;Γ[ai 7→JsiKIς ;Γ]i∈A) j∈B] fact
= ς(X)[(ai 7→JsiKIς ;Γ)i∈A\B, ai∈A< ,(a j 7→Jt j[ai:=si]i∈AKIς ;Γ) j∈B] ind. hyp.
= JX [(ai:=si)i∈A\B, ai∈A< ,(a j:=t j[ai:=si]i∈A) j∈B]KIς ;Γ Defn. 5.9
= JX [a j:=t j] j∈B[ai:=si]i∈AKIς ;Γ,a:φ Defn. 4.10
Some detailed calculations are hidden in the ‘fact’ used above. This follows using (Subλ ) and
(SubApp) from Definition 5.4, and is one reason that in that definition we ‘freshened’ the bi to
ci; to avoid clash.
Lemma 5.13. Write ‘Γ ` r,s : φ ’ as shorthand for ‘Γ ` r : φ and Γ ` s : φ ’. Suppose Γ  ς .
1. Suppose Γ ` r,r′ : φ→φ ′ and Γ ` s,s′ : φ . If JrKIς ;Γ=Jr′KIς ;Γ and JsKIς ;Γ=Js′KIς ;Γ then JrsKIς ;Γ=Jr′s′KIς ;Γ.
2. Suppose Γ,a:φ ` r,r′ : ψ . If JrKIς ;Γ,a:φ = Jr′KIς ;Γ,a:φ then Jλa:φ .rKIς ;Γ = Jλa:φ .r′KIς ;Γ.
3. Suppose X :φ ∈ Γ and {bi:φi | 1≤i≤n}⊆ Γ. Suppose Γ ` s j,s′j :ψ j and Js jKIς ;Γ = Js′jKIς ;Γ for 1≤ j≤n.
Then JX [bi:=si]n1KIς ;Γ = JX [bi:=s′i]n1KIς ;Γ.
Proof. These are facts of equality in sets.
Corollary 5.14 (Second soundness theorem). If r =β s (Defn. 4.11) and Γ ` r : φ and Γ |= ζ thenJrKIς ;Γ = JsKIς ;Γ.
Proof. Using Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13.
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We would expect a completeness result like Theorem 3.11 to hold and have a similar proof.
Details will be in a journal version. We should verify soundness under instantiating unknowns:
Theorem 5.15 (Third soundness theorem). Suppose Γ,X :χ ` r : φ and Γ ` t : ψ . Suppose Γ  ς .
Then Jr[X :=t]KIς ;Γ = JrKIς [X :=JtKIς ;Γ];Γ.
Proof. We consider (Meta) for X . Suppose Γ= Γ′,X :χ,(b j:ψ j)n1 and Γ ` si:ψi for 1≤i≤n so that by
(Meta) Γ′,X :χ,(b j:ψ j)n1 ` X [bi:=si]i. Then JX [bi:=si]iKIς [X := JtKIς ;Γ];Γ Defn. 5.9= JtKIς ;Γ[bi 7→JsiKIς ;Γ]i Lemm. 5.12=Jt[bi:=si]iKIς ;Γ.
6 Conclusions
We have built a semantics for the simply-typed λ -calculus (STLC), based on nominal sets. In
keeping with the ‘nominal’ philosophy, variables (names) are denoted by themselves. This
draws certain structure that is normally external to the denotation inside it, and this extra struc-
ture excludes some arguably pathological homomorphisms between models. We also exploit
the semantics to existential variables, or ‘holes’ (suggesting that we do not just get more models
out of this nominal semantics, but also more languages).
The constructions are not really any harder than for traditional STLC semantics. When
reading for instance Definition 3.2, the reader should mentally place this side-by-side with a
full specification of traditional STLC semantics, including for instance a precise definition of
valuations as graphs (these are functions with the general shape (A→ X)→ X). Our nominal
semantics for STLC is no harder than what the reader already knows; it is just different.
Atypically for nominal techniques so far as exemplified e.g. by [40, 38, 3, 5], atoms have
non-trivial types. These, if they assign atoms any type information at all, assign them ‘the type
of atoms’. There has been some work assigning more interesting types to atoms [8], but not in
denotations.
In the course of doing all these things, we note echoes of other strands of research. The
distinction between b ∈ A< and b : φ ∈ Γ is an instance of the distinction between meaning and
denotation (only finitely many of the atoms in the permission set of an unknown have existen-
tial import in the denotation) [36, 29]. Our use of A< and A>, which is borrowed from [6, 7], is
reminiscent of the two kinds of variable used by Frege [25] (for a more modern presentation
see e.g. [39, Chapter IV, Section 1]). This is more an analogy than a precise correspondence and
we will discuss matters further in a longer paper where we have more space to develop the
syntax. We still have only one set of atoms and the ‘nominal’ constructions, notably the notions
of support, binding, freshness, and nominal set, are unchanged. We have freely imported ideas
from (permissive) nominal terms, notably in our treatment of existential variables.
6.1 Related work
Valuations and unknowns. We gave unknowns a semantics using valuations in Definition 5.9.
Arguably it is disappointing: why map atoms to themselves in a denotation but then switch to
another (more traditional) methodology for unknowns? One answer is that atoms are universal
variables (could be replaced by anything) whereas unknowns are existential variables (must be
replaced by something), so it is reasonable to interpret them using a valuation, and perhaps we
should. Indeed there is a precedent for this: atoms correspond to δ -variables and unknowns to
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γ-variables from [42]. Making this formal by considering a paper similar to this one but aimed
at first-order logic is a topic of current research.
Still, there is an interesting alternative. In [16] a direct nominal semantics is explored for
unknowns X , analogous to how atoms a map to themselves in this paper, called two-level nomi-
nal sets. Two-level nominal sets with substitutions would provide a theory of incompleteness in
which holes are directly represented in the semantics. There is no need for that in this paper
because we have no level 3 variables (in the style e.g. of the λ -context calculus [18]); but if there
were, two-level nominal sets might be not only interesting, but necessary.
Models as presheafs. The reader familiar with category theory will recognise in Definition 3.2
a presheaf. In fact, we have enriched the usual presheaf SetsI (presheaves over finite sets and
injections between them) to a presheaf over an indexing category enriched with types. Con-
dition 5 of the two definitions (for ∩) states that these presheaves should preserve pullbacks
of monos; this is the critical property required for the sets-based presentation of this paper to
work [17]. Presheaves enriched over types have appeared in [43], without the nominal sets
style presentation and written for a different audience (one stemming from view of syntax and
substitution based on [11]). The presheaves are used differently: by considering initial objects,
inductive datatypes of well-typed syntax-with-binding are constructed.
Other theories of functions. Combinatory algebra (CA) assumes constants S, K, and I. Ax-
ioms allow them to model the λ -calculus. However, CA is strictly weaker than the theory of
β -conversion; the (ξ ) rule cannot be equationally axiomatised, because λ cannot be directly
expressed (though any given λ -term can be compiled to combinators). This can be fixed using
explicit indeterminates which, from the point of view of this paper, look a lot like atoms [37].
Alternatively, lambda-abstraction algebras (LAAs) are a first-order axiomatisation which does
satisfy ξ [30]; again, from the point of view of this paper LAAs look much like the axioms we
have considered. LAAs are not typed; a ‘nominal’ equivalent of them was considered by the
first author with Mathijssen [23]. So this paper is significantly different from both since, as we
see comparing this paper with [23], the addition of types makes a real difference to the models.
LAAs take semantics in ‘ordinary’ sets, so their semantics is not well-pointed in the sense of
this paper, and we do not obtain the language with meta-variables which we have developed
here or relate so directly with a wider research context (e.g. into nominal techniques). One
further subtle feature of LAA models is that they do not have finite support (we do not argue
whether this is good or bad; we merely observe this as a significant difference).
Salibra and others have thought deeply about the lattice properties of λ -calculus models. As
a final note we mention that nominal algebra satisfies an HSPA theorem [13], and permissive-
nominal algebra satisfies an HSP theorem [15]. This has also been considered by Kurz and
others [28]. The deeper theory here—how theorems of universal algebra applied to λ -calculus
adapt to the nominal context—remains unexplored.
Other theories of existential variables. In implemented systems like LF and Isabelle [33]
these are handled as a special syntactic category of higher-order variable. That is, an un-
known of type ι depending on (universal) variables of type τ and τ ′ is modelled by a vari-
able of type τ → τ ′→ ι . We make no claim that our model of existential variables is better in
implementation—it is simply too early to tell—but generally speaking we are against solving
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problems by moving to higher orders. Plenty of complexity can be encoded in function spaces,
and this is fine for implementation, but encoding something is not the same as having a good
mathematical model of it. Jojgov includes a excellent and detailed discussion of this issue in
[27], which is his own analysis of incompleteness; intuitively, by conflating β -conversion with
incompleteness it becomes impossible to distinguish between a complete derivation of higher
type, and an incomplete derivation of lower type. We add that the denotation of τ → τ ′→ ι is
uncountable, even if the denotations of τ , τ ′, and ι are countable. We would not immediately
expect there to be uncountably many existential variables of type ι , so if only on the grounds of
size we would hope for something smaller. Our denotations deliver this: an existential variable
of type ι is just an unknown X : ι .
Contextual modal type theory (CMTT) has two levels of variable; it enriches STLC with
‘modal types’ representing open code [31]. However, level 2 variables of CMTT are not ex-
istential variables; they are a species of intensional variable ranging over code. Making this
formal using a nominal semantics related to the semantics of this paper, is current research by
the first author.
6.2 Future work
We note that, as it stands, there is no general mathematical framework for the study of in-
complete terms in type theory. Implementors of proof assistants invent ad hoc methods for
representing incomplete terms, representing incomplete proof states, in their systems. Meth-
ods evolve more through trial and error than deep mathematical insight. For instance, early
versions of Coq used a complex system involving two syntactic classes—‘existential variables’
and ‘metavariables’—for representing incomplete proof states. Matita [1], whose design was
influenced by lessons learned in Coq’s development, used from the outset a much simpler
scheme where the concepts of ‘existential variable’ and ‘metavariable’ are unified [4].
We hope that the work presented in Section 4 forms the basis for further, mathematical
study of incomplete terms in type theory. For instance, the model of STLC in Definition 3.2
could be extended to a dependent type theory like e.g. compact λP [41, Subsection 14.2, Fig-
ure 14.1] (with or without incompleteness).
It should be fairly easy to internalise the substitution action for unknowns by adding λX ,
thus obtaining a two-level system with logic and computation at both levels—the result should
resemble the first two levels of the lambda-context calculus [18], but with a stronger theory
of α-equivalence and more reductions. One concrete application of this may be to express-
ing tactics—functions from incomplete derivations to incomplete derivations—in type-theory
based theorem-provers, which need to program on terms (considered as computation or proof
respectively). More goes into such a design than metavariables, but the character of metavari-
ables is key to that of existing implementations [34].
Notions of incompleteness can be motivated by efficiency and speed; notably [35] was mo-
tivated by optimising unification in LF. These ideas have led to several implementations; an
up-to-date overview is in [34]. Note that the details of the syntax are different: the work uses a
two-level type system with special types for closed code, and ‘meta-variables’ range over closed
elements of the domain (i.e. supp(ς(X)) =∅, intuitively). No general semantic theory has been
given for this line of research, and we suspect that the nominal denotations of this paper could
be turned to that task.
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